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Trade Marks as Adwords: An Aid to Competition or a Potential Infringement? 
An Evaluation of the Law In The Light of Recent Decisions 
By Alice Blythe, School of Law, University of Bolton 
Introduction 
In a line of case law starting with Google France v. Louis Vuitton1 and currently ending with 
Cosmetic Warriors v. Amazon2 the law relating to the use of trade marks in keyword 
advertising has evolved.  Inevitably such developments have been piecemeal in nature.  Each 
decision that marks a key stage of development in this line of judicial reasoning has been 
formulated in response to the pressing matters of that particular case.  Given the significance 
of these individual decisions the time has come for them to be viewed as a whole.   
 
As internet shopping and online advertising continues to grow it is likely that the courts will 
have to continue to grapple with the legal fallout from keyword advertising.  As the internet 
expands so too does the consumer reliance upon search engines to help navigate the vast 
quantity of information contained online.  Therefore the law relating to search engines and 
their revenue through advertising will continue to be hotly contested as the stakes become 
ever higher for the companies involved.  Following the decisions in Interflora v. Marks & 
Spencer3 and Cosmetic Warriors v. Amazon4 the time has come for an evaluation of the 
current law and to assess its adequacy.  This article aims to analyse this line of case law and 
the developments thus far before drawing conclusions as to possible future developments.  In 
                                                          
1 Google France Sarl v. Louis Vuitton Malletier SA (C-236/09) 
2 Cosmetic Warriors Ltd. v. Amazon.co.uk. Ltd. [2014] EWHC 181 (Ch) 
3 Interflora v. Marks & Spencer plc. (C-323/09) 
4 Cosmetic Warriors Ltd. v. Amazon.co.uk. Ltd. [2014] EWHC 181 (Ch) 
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order to achieve this, three key questions need to be addressed.  Firstly, at what point does the 
use of a trade mark as an adword become an infringement?  Secondly, why does the use of a 
trade mark as an adword become an infringement? It is only by answering these questions 
that one can finally ask the question should adwords be perceived as an aid to competition or 
a potential trade mark infringement?   
 
Identifying the point at which a trade mark as an adword becomes an infringement 
Search engine operators obtain their revenue through a process of advertising called adwords.  
Search engines allow internet surfers to type a keyword or words into their search engine.  
This will trigger the display of search results and a list of websites that contain that keyword 
within them.  These are called the organic links.  They also allow advertisers to purchase 
keywords meaning that when an internet surfer enters that word or phrase into the search 
engine along with the organic links that the search engine will show on the results page there 
will also be shown the sponsored links of the advertisers who have purchased that word as an 
adword.  These sponsored links are shown in a separate part of the results page but they are 
displayed in a prominent position as they have paid for the privilege of being listed in order 
to act as a bait to lure surfers into clicking upon their web-link.  Trade marks can be 
purchased as adwords and some trade mark proprietors have purchased their own marks as 
adwords in order to have their web-link not only listed amongst the organic links, but also in 
the sponsored link section whenever that term is entered as a keyword into the search engine.  
However, the search engine operators charge for adwords on a cost per click basis meaning 
that multiple advertisers can purchase the same keyword as an adword and he who pays most 
per click will have his sponsored link appear in the most prominent position.  This means that 
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while trade mark proprietors have been free to purchase their own mark as an adword they 
have also been able to purchase as adwords keywords corresponding to the trade marks of 
their rivals.  It is also common for advertisers to purchase variants of famous trade marks as 
adwords, for example common misspellings of registered marks.   
 
The scope for such actions to amount to a trade mark infringement are founded upon the 
provisions contained within article 5 of Directive 2008/95 which is the provision transcribed 
into U.K. law by section 10 of the Trade Marks Act 1994.  The provision reads as follows. 
“Article 5 
1. Rights conferred by a trade mark 
The registered trade mark shall confer on the proprietor exclusive rights therein.  The 
proprietor shall be entitled to prevent all third parties not having his consent from 
using in the course of trade: 
a) Any sign which is identical with the trade mark in relation to goods or services 
which are identical with those for which the trade mark is registered; 
b) Any sign where, because of its identity with, or similarity to, the trade mark and 
the identity or similarity of the goods or services covered by the trade mark and 
the sign, there exists a likelihood of confusion on the part of the public; the 
likelihood of confusion includes the likelihood of association between the sign 
and the trade mark 
2. Any Member State may also provide that the proprietor shall be entitled to prevent all 
third parties not having his consent from using in the course of trade any sign which is 
identical with, or similar to, the trade mark in relation to goods or services which are 
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not similar to those for which the trade mark is registered, where the latter has a 
reputation in the Member State and where use of that sign without due cause takes 
unfair advantage of, or is detrimental to, the distinctive character or the repute of the 
trade mark.” 
 
Article 5 (1) (a) was intended to prevent third parties from using in the course of trade a sign 
identical with a registered trade mark in relation to goods or services which are identical to 
those for which the mark is registered.  This is the anti-counterfeiting provision.  It is based 
on the confusion rationale on the basis that if an identical sign to a registered mark was used 
in relation to identical goods or services there would inevitably be a likelihood of confusion 
on the part of the public and the mark would not be free to clearly signal the one economic 
undertaking of its proprietor.  When this is applied to keyword advertising the third party who 
purchases an adword that is identical or similar to a registered trade mark is using that 
identical sign in relation to the identical goods.  It has all the ingredients of a classic trade 
mark infringement.   
 
Under article 5 (1)(a) where the sign and the trade mark and the goods or services are 
identical, confusion is automatically presumed.  Therefore the only real recourse available to 
a defendant is to plead that they were not using the sign in the course of trade.  At this point 
there are two options open to the defendant.  The first is that he could argue that the use in 
question was not use on the course of trade.  In Trebor Basset v. The Football Association5 
the use made by Trebor of the England F.A’s registered trade mark was deemed to be 
                                                          
5 Trebor Bassett v. Football Association Ltd. [1997] F.S.R. 211 Ch.D. 
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incidental use in that the trade mark was incidentally included when photographs of England 
Football players in their team kit were added to packets of sweets as a promotional offer.  The 
players in the photographs were wearing the trade mark as it was emblazoned across the front 
of their shirts and so inevitably it would be part of the photographs.  Other instances which 
may be deemed to fall under the heading non-trade mark use will be where the public 
perceives the sign as being an embellishment and not used as a trade mark.  For example in 
Adidas Salomon v. Nike Europe Holding6 the claimant owned a number of trade mark 
registrations for a three stripe motif as applied to sportswear.  The defendant marketed shorts 
and tracksuit trousers with two stripes in a contrasting colour running down the side seams.  
The evidence showed it was common knowledge that such use was decorative and not use as 
a mark. The second option available to defendants is to argue that they were not the party 
using the sign in the course of trade and where adwords are concerned this is important.  Due 
to the way the business model for keyword advertising is structured there are three key 
players involved.  Firstly there is the trade mark proprietor.  Secondly there is the search 
engine operator who stores the keywords and information and receives payment for the sale 
of such information as adwords.  Thirdly there is the advertiser who selects and purchases a 
keyword corresponding to a registered trade mark as an adword.  In Google France v. Louis 
Vuitton7 the CJEU ruled on who was the party deemed to be using the sign in the course of 
trade and therefore potentially liable for any infringement.  In the case the famous fashion 
house issued proceedings against Google on the basis that when an internet surfer typed the 
words Louis Vuitton into the search engine there appeared amongst the search results links 
for websites offering counterfeit Louis Vuitton items.  However, the CJEU held that the 
search engine operator could not be held liable as they were merely acting as an information 
                                                          
6 Adidas Salomon AG v. Nike Europe Holding BV [2007] E.T.M.R. 12 at paragraphs 11-13. 
7 Google France Sarl v. Louis Vuitton Malletier SA (C-236/08) 
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host and therefore were not using the sign.  They were also covered by article 14 of Directive 
2000/31 the E-Commerce Directive which exempts information hosts from this type of 
action.  The CJEU ruled the party who was using the sign in the course of trade was the 
advertiser who selected and purchased as an adword the keyword corresponding to a 
registered trade mark.   
 
The next issue to be dealt with is identifying the point at which use of a sign identical with a 
registered trade mark as an adword becomes an infringement.  The test for this was set out by 
the CJEU in Google France v. Louis Vuitton and further elaborated in Interflora v. Marks & 
Spencer8.  The facts were that Marks & Spencer had purchased the keyword Interflora as an 
adword and that whenever this was typed into the search engine it triggered a sponsored link 
for Marks & Spencer’s own flower delivery service.  The word Interflora had been selected 
because although it does not enjoy the largest market share of long distance flower delivery 
services it does have a high level of brand recognition amongst the public and therefore its 
trade mark has become heavily associated with this mode of delivery, namely where 
individual florists sign up to a franchise agreement that they will produce and deliver set 
flower arrangements for a set price.  Therefore flowers can be sent long distance as the shop 
nearest to the recipient’s address will fulfil the order.  Following the case Google France v. 
Louis Vuitton9 it is clear that the search engine operator is not liable and therefore Interflora 
issued proceedings against Marks & Spencer.  Once again the matter had to be referred to the 
CJEU for a preliminary ruling.  The subsequent test set out in the judgment of the CJEU was 
formulated in such a way as to pay particular regard to the specific nature of keyword 
                                                          
8 Interflora Inc. v. Marks & Spencer plc. (C-323-09) 
9 Google France Sarl v. Louis Vuitton Malletier SA (C-236/08) 
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advertising and the sponsored links they trigger.  A sponsored link contains the web-link that 
if clicked upon will automatically take the surfer to that advertiser’s website.  It also contains 
a commercial message which in effect is a small amount of advertising ‘patter’.  The CJEU 
have repeatedly held, most notable in Arsenal v. Reed10, that the key function of a trade mark 
is threefold, its function of indicating origin, its advertising function and its investment 
function.  Therefore the exclusive rights granted to proprietors upon registration of their 
marks must protect these core values.  By applying this reasoning to adwords the test for 
infringement centres upon whether the content of the sponsored link and the third party’s 
advert could harm this core function.  In Google France v. Louis Vuitton the CJEU stated 
that, 
“83. The question whether that function of the trade mark is adversely affected when internet 
users are shown, on the basis of a keyword identical with a mark, a third party’s ad, such as 
that of a competitor of the proprietor of that mark, depends in particular on the manner in 
which that ad is presented. 
84. The function of indicating the origin of the mark is adversely affected if the ad does not 
enable normally informed and reasonably attentive internet users, or enables them only with 
difficulty to ascertain whether the goods or services referred to by the ad originate from the 
proprietor of the trade mark or an undertaking economically connected to it or, on the 
contrary, originate from a third party.”11 
This reasoning was subsequently re stated by the CJEU in their judgment in Interflora v. 
Marks & Spencer. It is the subsequent application of this test by Arnold J. which has led to 
                                                          
10 Arsenal Football Club v. Reed (C-206/01) 
11 Google France Sarl v. Louis Vuitton Malletier SA (C-236-08) at paragraphs 83-84. 
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the Court of Appeal ordering a re-trial.  In assessing where Arnold J. went wrong they 
identified his reliance upon his own earlier judgment in Datacard v. Eagle Technologies Ltd. 
“263. Secondly, and perhaps more importantly, the Court introduces a new test in [84], which 
despite the reference to Celine is not to be found in that case.  The new test is that the origin 
function of the trade mark is adversely affected if the use of the sign considered in context 
does not enable average consumers or enables them only with difficulty, to ascertain whether 
the goods or services referred to under the sign originate from the proprietor of the trade mark 
or an undertaking economically linked to it, or from a third party.  It appears from [84]-[85] 
and [89]-[90] that this is a test of a likelihood of confusion, but with a reversed onus i.e. the 
onus lies upon the third party to show that the use of the sign in context is sufficiently clear 
that here is no possibility of confusion on the part of the average consumer as to the origin of 
the advertised goods or services.”12 
This is what led Arnold J. to incorrectly apply the test set by the CJEU due to falling into 
error by linking it with the test for a likelihood of confusion set out in article 5(1)(b) and 
reversing the onus of proof.  In the appeal of Interflora v. Marks & Spencer13 Kitchin L.J. 
was keen to point out that the test for infringement under article 5(1)(a) is not the likelihood 
of confusion test found under article 5(1)(b) and that they are different.  However, he did 
accept that the CJEU in Google France v. Louis Vuitton had introduced a new test for 
infringement in the context of keyword advertising.  At paragraph 132 Kitchin L.J. held; 
“We would say straight away that we accept that the Court of Justice has, in its decision in 
Google France (at [82] to [90]), enunciated a new test to be applied by the national court in 
assessing whether the accused use has adversely affected, or is liable adversely to affect, the 
                                                          
12 Datacard v. Eagle Technologies Ltd. [2011] EWHC 244 (Pat.) at paragraph 263. 
13 Interflora Inc. v. Marks & Spencer plc. [2014] EWCA Civ. 1403. 
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origin function of a trade mark at least in the context of keyword advertising cases.  However, 
and contrary to the view expressed by the judge, we do not recognise in this passage from the 
decision of the Court in Google France any conventional formulation of a likelihood of 
confusion test: nor do we detect any suggestion, still less a finding , that it imposes a burden 
of proof upon a third party.”14 
Therefore the CJEU have formulated a new test in Google France to be applied in keyword 
advertising cases in order to determine whether the ability of the trade mark to clearly signal 
trade origin had been affected.  This test is that the advert must enable the average consumer, 
who is a hypothetical construct and not a statistical test and has the characteristics of being 
reasonably well-informed and circumspect, to ascertain that the goods or services originate 
from a third party and not the trade mark proprietor.  This new test appears to be limited to 
keyword advertising cases however, this is not absolute and the Court of Appeal seemed 
somewhat vague on this.  Therefore the issue of what the full impact of this new test, as 
formulated by the CJEU, will be upon the operation of article 5(1)(a) remains to be fully 
resolved.  Furthermore, although the average consumer is mentioned in relation to assessing 
the potential harm caused to the core function of a trade mark in relation to article 5(1)(a) the 
CJEU have not morphed this provision with that of a likelihood of confusion found under 
article 5(1)(b) nor allowed such reasoning to creep into this provision.  The test under article 
5(1)(a) does not involve any reversal of the burden of proof and therefore the onus rests upon 
the party making the allegation of infringement to prove this.   
 
                                                          
14 Interflora Inc. v. Marks & Spencer plc. [2014] EWCA Civ. 1403 at paragraph 132. 
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It was thought that due to Interflora being a franchise whereby individual florists who sign up 
to the scheme continue to trade under their own names may create a real risk that consumers 
encountering the sponsored link for Marks & Spencer following an internet search for 
Interflora, may conclude that Marks & Spencer were part of the Interflora network.  
However, given the fact that this case is set for re-trial on the basis that the evidential burden 
was incorrectly discharged this remains to be seen.   
 
Why such use constitutes and infringement 
Wherever the use of a trade mark as an adword triggers a sponsored link that does not enable 
the average consumer, who is reasonably observant and circumspect, to ascertain that the two 
are not economically linked, or only enables them to do so with great difficulty, there will 
inevitably be an infringement because the core function of the trade mark will be affected.  In 
Arsenal v. Reed15 the CJEU reiterated that the essential function of a trade mark is that it acts 
as a signal of trade origin thus demonstrating that the goods or services are of a quality that 
the proprietor is content to distribute under his banner.  It is for this reason that trade mark 
proprietors loathe counterfeit goods because they have no control over the quality of those 
goods.  The ability to clearly signal trade origin is essential to a trade mark and why in order 
to be capable of registration in the first place it must be a sign capable of being represented 
graphically which is capable of distinguishing goods or services of one undertaking form 
those of other undertakings.  Therefore marks which are devoid of distinctive character will 
fall within the absolute grounds of refusal to register under section 3 Trade Marks Act 1994.  
By that same principle signs which have become generic and are used to indicate the type of 
                                                          
15 Arsenal Football Club v. Reed (C-206/01) 
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goods or services rather than those from a particular proprietor will also be refused 
registration on the absolute grounds.  Brands which have achieved a position of dominance 
within a particular product market and enjoy a high level of recognition amongst the public 
are at risk of becoming generic if the public start to use their trade mark to indicate the class 
of goods rather than their goods only.  For example ‘asprin’ has become generic and as it now 
describes the drug and not its manufacturer.  This is why Coca-Cola are proactive in 
protecting their mark against such use because they recognise that enjoying such high 
recognition and market dominance is a double edged sword and that the down side is that 
they face an increased risk from becoming generic.  In Interflora v. Marks & Spencer16 this 
was also a factor.  During proceedings it became apparent that the adword Interflora was 
chosen because that brand enjoyed such a high recognition amongst the general public for its 
long distance flower delivery service.  Marks & Spencer were keen to attract consumers to 
their own website thereby showing consumers that they offered a similar service.  Marks & 
Spencer were therefore using the Interflora mark in a descriptive sense to describe the mode 
of flower delivery.  At first instance Arnold J. noted that there was a risk of the trade mark 
becoming a generic term for any flower delivery business17.  Inherent in this argument is the 
fact that search engines appear to actively encourage this type of behaviour on the part of the 
public.  Consumers often type trade marks into search engines and often chose to enter that of 
the market leader knowing that the search engine will also produce links to alternative 
providers of the same type of goods or services.  Such activity is good for promoting 
competition but at the same time it also promotes the use of trade marks not for directing the 
consumer to that specific brand but to that product sector in which that brand is a key 
                                                          
16 Interflora v. Marks & Spencer plc. [2009] EWHC 1095 (Ch) 
17 Ibid at paragraph 48. 
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operator.  Such use inevitably raises issues about the risk trade marks face in becoming 
generic terms and forfeiting their registration.   
 
In Interflora v Marks & Spencer18 (Court of Appeal decision 5th November) Kitchin L.J. did 
look at the risk of a trade mark becoming generic due to keyword advertising at paragraphs 
102-103.  However, this issue was only looked at from the perspective of potential 
infringement under article 5(2), in particular the risk to harming the trade mark’s 
distinctiveness.  A mark’s inability to signal trade origin due to it being a generic term for a 
class of goods is the ultimate lack of distinctiveness which is not only an issue under article 
5(2) but surely it is something which also warrants consideration under article 5(1)(a) as it 
strikes at the core function of a trade mark.  Kitchin L.J. summarised the CJEU’s findings on 
this matter as follows; 
“The Court dealt first with the concept of  dilution and accepted that the use by a third party 
in the course of trade of a sign identical or similar to a trade mark with a reputation reduces 
the latter’s distinctiveness when it contributes to turning the trade mark into a generic term.  
But, it continued, this is not necessarily the case when such a sign is used as a keyword.”19 
Whilst use of a trade mark as an adword may not necessarily cause such damage, and this 
would be consistent with their view that use of trade marks in keyword advertising is not an 
inherently objectionable practice per se, there remains an element of risk.  Until now this 
appears to have been dismissed with the infringement arguments under article 5(2) because 
keyword advertising is seen as good for competition and that the use of trade marks as 
                                                          
18 Interflora Inc. v. Marks & Spencer plc. [2014] EWCA Civ. 1403. 
19 Ibid at paragraph 103. 
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adwords is not a practice which is taking an unfair advantage of the marks involved due to 
the promotion of competition being viewed as a fair advantage.  However, given that the 
CJEU have been at pains to point out that the core function of a trade mark is to signal trade 
origin and that protection offered by article 5(1) is absolute, when that function along with 
investment, communication and advertising is threatened, it seems likely that in the near 
future the CJEU will be called upon again to provide further guidance upon this matter.   
 
This same issue played a key part in Cosmetic Warriors v. Amazon20.  The facts were that 
Amazon had purchased ‘Lush’ as an adword and that whenever this was typed into a Google 
search engine it would trigger a sponsored link for the Amazon website.  This was the 
external use where Amazon played the role of purchaser of an adword and therefore under 
the criteria of Google France v. Louis Vuitton21 was the party using the sign in the course of 
trade and potentially liable for any infringement.  Amazon also had its own internal search 
facility within its own website.  Amazon did not sell any ‘Lush’ products but crucially 
Amazon did not display a ‘no results found’ message in response to a consumer search.  The 
search mechanism then as now, automatically selects and therefore directs consumers to 
alternative products.  The search engine also directs customers to items which have been 
purchased by other customers who have searched for the same item.  Lush claims to be the 
inventor of the bath bomb, a product with which it is heavily associated, and therefore when 
consumers entered the terms ‘lush’, ‘lush cosmetics’ or ‘lush bath bomb’ into the Amazon 
search engine they were taken to pages where alternative bath bombs and cosmetic products 
were offered for sale.  Amazon were using the term Lush in a generic sense to describe the 
                                                          
20 Cosmetic Warriors Ltd. v. Amazon.co.uk. Ltd. [2014] EWHC 181 (Ch) 
21 Google France Sarl v. Louis Vuitton Malletier SA (C-236/08) 
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type of goods rather than the supplier in much the same way that Marks & Spencer had been 
using the word Interflora to signal a type of service rather than the provider.  In respect to this 
internal use of the keyword ‘lush’, Amazon were hoping to be viewed as playing the role of 
an information host and therefore as falling within the exemption outlined in article 14 
Directive 2000/31.  They also attempted to justify their use by making reference to consumer 
behaviour and the fact that their internal website software was developed to allow consumers 
greater choice and competition by following trends of what other consumers had gone on to 
purchase. However, Mr. John Baldwin Q.C. set out that the right to give the public access to 
such technological developments did not go so far as to allow a trader such as Amazon to ride 
rough shod over intellectual property rights and to treat the Lush trade mark as little more 
than a generic indication of a class of goods in which the consumer might have an interest.22   
 
In L’Oreal v. eBay23, L’Oreal sought to hold eBay liable for the fact that when consumers 
searched for L’Oreal products on eBay many of the items offered for sale infringed their 
trade mark by either being counterfeit goods or goods not intended for resale within the 
European Economic Area (EEA) and were therefore genuine goods in which L’Oreal had not 
exhausted their rights in line with article 7 Directive 2008/95.  All trade mark proprietors 
have the exclusive right to first enter products bearing their mark into the market of the EEA 
or to allow a third party to do so with their consent.  Goods bearing the proprietor’s trade 
mark that have been entered into the market outside of the EEA cannot be entered into the 
EEA market without the proprietor’s consent.  eBay operated a verified rights owner (VeRO) 
system whereby once notified of an infringing offer being made they would take down that 
                                                          
22 Cosmetic Warriors Ltd. v. Amazon.co.uk Ltd. [2014] EWHC 181 (Ch) at paragraph 53. 
23 L’Oreal v. eBAY [2012] Bus L.R. 1369. 
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listing.  Given that the scale of the internet is so vast and that attempting to identify and then 
notify online market hosts as to each infringement L’Oreal decided to pursue eBay and 
attempt to hold them liable, in response eBay sought to rely on the exemption contained 
within article 14 Directive 2000/31.   
“Article 14.  Hosting 
1. Where an information society service is provided that consists of the storage of 
information provided by a recipient of the service, Member States shall ensure that the 
service provider is not liable for the information stored at the request of a recipient of 
the service, on condition that: 
a) the provider does not have actual knowledge of illegal activity or information and, as 
regards claims for damages, is not aware of facts or circumstances from which the 
illegal activity or information is apparent; …” 
 
Drawing on their reasoning in Google France v. Louis Vuitton the CJEU held that where 
eBay was simply acting as an online marketplace host and there was an infringement due to 
the content of the third party’s commercial message listing infringing items for sale, that 
eBay was not liable as it was not the party using the sign in the course of trade.   
 
In Cosmetic Warriors v. Amazon24, Amazon tried to rely on this exemption in relation to the 
use of the Lush keyword within its own internal search engine contained within the Amazon 
website.  Their failure to succeed in this regard was due to the fact that Amazon did not sell 
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any Lush products.  In order to succeed on this ground Amazon would have needed third 
parties sellers to have been using the mark Lush on their goods and merely have been using 
the Amazon website as an online marketplace.  The fact that none of them did so and that 
Amazon did not sell any Lush products but merely used the mark as a generic term to direct 
customers to alternative branded goods meant that they were not acting as an information 
host.   
 
Should such use constitute an infringement? 
Inevitably it is always well-known trade marks that are selected by third parties as adwords.  
They do so in the hope that they can, to use Dawson’s phrase ‘usurp a corner of the giant’s 
robe’25.  Famous trade marks are often used as an aid in bait-and-switch or substitution 
selling whereby the fame of the well-known mark is used as a bait to lure internet surfers to 
the third party website where alternative products or services are provided.  The key to 
avoiding any infringement under articles 5(1 ) (a) and 5(1) (b) of Directive 2008/95 is to 
ensure that any likelihood of confusion is dispelled prior to the purchase being made.  The 
fame of a trade mark will be the result of extensive marketing and investment.  As mentioned 
previously these elements along with that of indicating origin are the essential function of a 
trade mark.  Trade marks with a reputation are given extra protection from the actions of third 
parties by article 5(2) Directive 2008/95.   
 
                                                          
25 Norma Dawson “Famous and Well-Known Trade Marks- ‘Usurping A Corner of The Giant’s Robe’” [1998] 
I.P.Q. 350. 
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Following the CJEU ruling in Davidoff v. Gofkid26 it is now held that the goods or services in 
question do not have to be dissimilar in order for article 5 (2) to apply and therefore this 
provision could also now be applied to circumstances where a rival trader has purchased a 
keyword corresponding to a famous trade mark as an adword in respect of the identical goods 
or services.  As Vivant27 notes when analysing the comments made by the CJEU in Interflora 
v. Marks & Spencer the whole purpose of a competitor of the trade mark proprietor selecting 
their well-known trademark as an adword is to take advantage of its distinctive character and 
repute.  Vivant calls this the attraction function of a trade mark.  Vivant also notes that this 
element of a trade mark exists in reality as soon as the trade mark acquires a reputation even 
if it is not a ‘great’ reputation28.  Therefore it is viewed as though it is a sliding scale and to 
some extent this marks a difference from what is outlined in article 5 (2) where it states the 
mark ‘has a reputation’ thus seeming to indicate that the mark must have already reached a 
fixed point on the measuring scale of reputation in order to be eligible to utilize this 
provision.  Vivant seems to advocate that all marks have a reputation and it is a sliding scale 
where the amount of protection offered by the law should be in proportion to the extent of the 
reputation the mark enjoys.  Such an approach would significantly impact upon the use of 
trade marks as adwords.  There is a delicate balance to be struck between the rights of 
consumers and other traders, by enabling search engines and adwords to act as an aid to 
competition, and the rights of trade marks and their proprietors not to suffer a detriment.  
However, Vivant notes that trade marks are the result of considerable investments and 
therefore it is a legitimate aim to protect them from misuse by third parties.  To some extent 
well-known trade marks are protected from parasitical practices.  Where third parties seek to 
                                                          
26 Davidoff & Cie SA and Zino Davidoff SA v. Gofkid Ltd. (C-292/00) 
27 Michel Vivant, Revisiting Trade Marks, (Vol.3), Q.M.J.I.P., pp 307-312. 
28 Ibid. at p. 311. 
This is a pre-copyedited, author-produced version of an article accepted for publication in The 
European Intellectual Property Review following peer review.  The definitive published version Alice 
Blythe, Trade Marks as Adwords: An Aid to Competition or a Potential Infringement? An Evaluation 
of The Law in The Light of Recent Decisions [2015] E.I.P.R. 225-231 is available online on Westlaw UK 
or from Thompson Reuters DocDel service. 
18 
 
obtain an unfair advantage by feeding from the fame of the registered mark they will fall foul 
of article 5 (2) Directive 2008/95.  Vivant sees this as a rather long winding approach and 
suggests a short cut.   
“Obviously it is possible to penalize this kind of behaviour as parasitical practices.  But why 
go the long way around?  When somebody uses the trade mark of a third party as a keyword 
without any kind of legitimacy, it tries to divert consumers and, as the ECJ observes, she does 
not ‘pay the proprietors of the trade marks any compensation in respect of that use’ she acts 
directly against the ‘philosophy’ and the economy of the system.  And that, in our view, very 
simply, demands sanction.” 29  
Therefore the proposal put forward by Vivant would mean that when a third party used a sign 
identical to a registered trade mark as an adword without authorisation of the trade mark 
proprietor and without legitimacy such use would be analysed as an infringement.  This then 
begs the question what is meant by legitimacy?  When is such use legitimate?  Perhaps this 
can be equated to honest practices with the courts taking regard of what is deemed normal 
practice within the sector.  However, in order to do that one must ask whether an action can 
be justified purely because such acts are widespread.  Vivant notes that it is one thing to 
penalize an infringement but another thing entirely when penalizing an unfair practice.30  
Perhaps due to the widespread use of adwords there ought to be guidance drafted at an EU 
level to try and define the boundaries of what is permissible use and what is not.  The 
question to be answered would be to what extent should a trade mark proprietors competitors 
be allowed to purchase and use a keyword identical to their trade mark as an adword?  Should 
such use be allowed and can it be justified?  Presumably there would need to be some 
permissible use of signs identical to trade marks as adwords because consumers rely on 
                                                          
29 Ibid. at p. 312. 
30 Ibid. at p. 312. 
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search engines to navigate the internet.  Perhaps the EU should draft some guidance on what 
is permissible.   
 
Conclusion 
Currently the only guidance as to what is permissible in relation to use of trade marks as 
adwords is found in the case law of the CJEU, most notably their judgments in Google 
France v. Louis Vuitton and Interflora v. Marks & Spencer.  The initial confusion as to the 
true nature of the correct test to be applied, which initially led to its incorrect application, 
appears to have been solved by the Court of Appeal decision which provides much needed 
clarity.  One point which was repeatedly made clear by the CJEU, and highlighted by Kitchin 
L.J.,31 is that internet advertising using keywords which are identical to trade marks is not an 
inherently objectionable practice.  The aim of such use is to offer internet users alternatives to 
the goods or services of trade mark proprietors and it is not the purpose of trade marks to 
protect their proprietors from fair competition.  However, this begs the question what is fair 
as opposed to unfair competition in such circumstances and whether the correct balance 
between promoting competition and protecting trade marks has been met?   Furthermore it 
remains unclear as to what extent the extended protection offered to trade marks with a 
reputation, by virtue of article 5(2) of directive 2008/95, will play a role in regards to this 
issue.  As the power of the internet and online advertising grows, so too is the likelihood of a 
return to this issue and that the CJEU will be called upon to answer these questions.   
 
                                                          
31 Interflora Inc. v. Marks & Spencer [2014] EWCA Civ. 1403 at paragraph 98. 
